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How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2020: 
A Warning from the Future 
By Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. 
 
Editors Note:  Security is much more than not losing, but it is predicated on not losing.  Our focus 
with the writing competition can reasonably be seen as addressing a subset of a broader concept of 
security. This entry didn't answer directly address that subset question, but it surely framed the 
challenge and presumptions in which the question exists.  We were happy to receive it and to pub-
lish it here.  Our thanks to the author, Major General Charlie Dunlap, and to other like-minded 
thinkers and contributors to Small Wars Journal such as Colonel Gian Gentile, for challenging 
group think and forcing intellectual rigor. 
 
The following is a transcript of a secret address 
delivered by the Great Leader to the Supreme War 
Council late in the year 2020. 
 
IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE AND THE 
PARTY, I welcome my comrades to this celebration 
of our great victory over our most arrogant enemy, 
America.  A little over ten years ago they crowed 
about how their entire armed forces were ―adapt-
ing‖ to wage what was then known as ―irregular 
warfare‖.  They were guilty, as so many before 
them were, of preparing to fight the last war in-
stead of the next.  We observed their error and ex-
ploited it into the victory we honor today. 
The core of their miscalculation was the be-
lief that conventional war against powerful nation 
states - what they called ―peer competitors‖ - was 
passé.   
With great fanfare, the Americans issued a 
new manual for counterinsurgency, and many of 
their national security elites embraced it as if it 
were a panacea for all possible conflicts.  To our 
delight, they restructured their entire military to 
conduct such low-tech operations.  We had no in-
tent to fight that kind of war, and did not do so 
when the time came. 
Popular American thinking at that time ex-
pressed a grand vision that irregular wars, like the 
insurgencies they fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
would be the primary challenge for U.S. forces for 
the future.   
Of course, no one disputed that such con-
flicts would persist in the 21st century.  Still, why 
American policymakers thought that there was an 
appetite among their electorate to put massive 
numbers of U.S. troops on the ground in another 
―Iraq‖ or ―Afghanistan-like‖ situation is a mystery 
to us, but that is what they instructed their plan-
ners to concentrate upon. 
They ignored such evidence as the fact that 
significant majorities of their people still concluded 
it was a mistake to have waged war in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, despite such military success as they 
enjoyed.  The American people – and their politi-
cians - were rightly wary of another such operation.  
Their own experts calculated the material cost well 
into the trillions of dollars and the human cost 
played out on their television screens nightly.   
When some of their generals tried to warn 
that their military needed to be prepared to con-
front adversaries like ourselves, their own Secre-
tary of Defense mocked them as suffering from 
―Next-War-it is.‖   
We cheered when it was mandated that in 
order to ―remain viable‖ any major arms program 
―will have to show some utility and relevance‖ to 
irregular operations.  The implementation of this 
meant that the weapons we feared the most were 
never built in the numbers that might have de-
terred us.  It seems that their strategists never fully 
distinguished between the serious concerns irregu-
lar conflicts raised and the truly existential threats 
presented by ‗regular‘ war. 
We also celebrated when their Department 
of Defense announced that ―nation building‖ and 
―stability‘ operations were being put on equal foot-
ing with warfighting.  Such a diffusion of focus 
eroded the fighting ability of their once mighty mil-
itary machine.  No longer was it exclusively cen-
tered upon what their Supreme Court once said 
was their purpose, that is, to ―fight wars or prepare 
to fight them should the occasion arise.‖ 
This obsession with using the military for 
nation building and stability operations was 
strange to us.  Americans apparently never really 
understood it was a mistake to make their military, 
the most authoritarian, undemocratic, and socialis-
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tic element of their society, the ―face‖ of their coun-
try to peoples struggling in failed or failing states.   
Yes, the U.S. military did succeed in stabiliz-
ing some of these countries, but they imprinted the 
people with the belief that only the armed forces 
could get things done in a society.   
In truth, the power of American society was 
a product of its civilian institutions, not its mili-
tary.  It was the free enterprise system, not a mili-
tary structure, which produced the freedom and 
economic vitality that the U.S. enjoyed, and that 
gave its military its supremacy.  Yet with the bulk 
of the U.S. military devoting itself to nation-
building, the nations they ―built‖ around the world 
established themselves with uniformed people, not 
civilians, as the movers and shakers in their society 
– exactly like their American military mentors.   
It is no surprise that capable and secure civi-
lian-led governments never permanently emerged 
from these efforts.  Of course, we were glad to deal 
with military strongmen in these newly ―built‖ gov-
ernments.  They pragmatically accepted – no, wel-
comed - our political ideology that recognized that 
Party leaders knew what was better for the People 
than did the people themselves as true democracies 
preached.   
In devising their defense architecture in the 
post-Iraq/Afghanistan era, the Americans also 
never really understood that although insurgencies 
could inflict great harm to their interests, they 
could never present a genuine threat to the exis-
tence of the United States as superpower.  Only a 
nation such as ourselves, capable of fielding not 
just one or a few nuclear weapons as an insurgency 
or terrorist organization might, but hundreds and 
even thousands of them, could truly threaten 
America‘s very survival. 
Some Americans believed that conflict with 
us was implausible because of the economic links 
between our countries.  To them, war was ―illogi-
cal‖ and, therefore, wholly improbable.  Apparent-
ly, they were unfamiliar with the British economist 
Norman Angell who, a few years before the out-
break of the First World War, wrote a popular book 
that promoted just such a theory.  Of course, he 
was profoundly wrong, as were the Americans of 
2010 who thought similarly. 
Actually, the logic of economics is more a 
cause of war than a promoter of peace.  Our case is 
illustrative.  In the early part of the 21st century, 
we enjoyed tremendous economic progress be-
cause we were able to exploit the wage advantage 
we obtained by turning the proletariat into ex-
tremely low-cost factory workers.  Because we of-
fered cheap labor, manufacturing of every type 
flowed into our country.  This produced a meteoric 
rise in exports, and our nation was awash in prof-
its.  Our international prestige sky-rocketed. 
The march of technology, however, did not 
favor us.  The marriage of nanotechnology and ro-
botics produced automated manufacturing systems 
of increasing sophistication.  As more and more 
such machines were developed, their cost – like so 
many other computer-based products – continued 
to drop.  In an amazingly short period, machines 
could economically replace the low-wage workers 
that had favored us so much for several decades. 
We watched with alarm as the productivity 
of these advanced robots rose.  In time, they be-
came even cheaper than the cheapest of our labor-
ers.  Increasingly, it was cost-effective for the de-
veloped countries to have their own factories close 
to the point of sale.  Such local factories also did 
not suffer the transportations expenses our prod-
ucts incurred.  In short, the new fully-automated 
local factories of the developed nations soon held 
an almost insuperable advantage. 
That left controlling the cost of energy and 
raw materials as the only other factors in the man-
ufacturing process that we could hope to control to 
maintain our dominance.  This, as you know, led to 
conflict with the Americans.   
You recall how: with respect to energy, we 
increasingly were forced to rely upon cheaper but 
environmentally unsound sources such as coal and 
other fossil fuels.  The world took notice, mainly 
because advanced analytical techniques permitted 
scientists to trace pollutants back to our country.   
As various international organizations criti-
cized us and even imposed various sanctions, our 
message to our people was unwavering and reso-
nated with our history.  We told them that outsid-
ers were once again trying to subjugate us, and this 
began the drumbeat of nationalism that we would 
use so effectively later. 
Likewise, we sought to control key sources of 
raw materials around the globe.  When tough 
commercial negotiations failed we bribed – and, 
when necessary, threatened - the leaders of many 
of the nations into granting us concessions at a 
huge discount.  By the time their own people rea-
lized what was happening, we had our own forces 
in place to ―protect‖ our citizens and our ―proper-
ty.‖  When the international community tried to 
stop us, we fought them. 
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The Americans, especially those who naively 
believed that we shared their values, were slow to 
realize how we intended to deal with the crisis.  
They thought that we were a peaceful people more 
interested in commerce than conflict.   
Clearly, the Americans proved their naiveté.  
Why?  They tend to ―mirror image‖ peoples who, in 
reality, do not reflect their culture or ideals.  Amer-
icans too often are inclined to believe that all 
peoples think as they do.  In our case, they did not 
appreciate how pervasive and deep-seated the re-
sentment of past foreign domination was among 
our peoples.   
That resentment easily translated into war-
supporting nationalism.  Our Party used our coun-
try‘s always latent nationalism as a powerful tool 
for energizing the People.  It was not difficult for 
our Information Ministry to paint a picture that 
once again foreigners were seeking to reduce our 
nation to subservience.  Support for the use of 
force was wide and deep not just among Party 
members, but the proletariat generally.  
We would not have dreamed of using force if 
the Americans still had their capabilities they once 
possessed to dominate high-technology war.  Inte-
restingly, too many Americans miscalculated how 
quickly once-backward societies like ours could 
integrate new technology into war-making systems 
that could defeat the U.S. even without resorting to 
nuclear weapons.   
Our steady increase in defense spending on 
high-technology paid off – especially as the Ameri-
cans underfunded or even terminated the pro-
grams we most feared.  Without a doubt, the U.S. 
underestimated the investment and effort that 
would be required to maintain the military supe-
riority they enjoyed at the beginning of the 21st 
century. 
For example, a capability that really con-
cerned us was American airpower.  In particular, it 
was the U.S.‘s ability to project that airpower any-
where in the world at almost any time.  However, 
the ability to do so depended upon aerial tankers 
that re-fuel its warplanes during long flights.  
America‘s air force was repeatedly frustrated by 
political and legal difficulties from renewing and 
expanding its tanker fleet.  In our system, of 
course, we have no such problems where national 
security is concerned. 
In the end, the U.S. had too few warplanes to 
contain us.  We mastered getting inside their "ac-
quisition loop" and deployed newer systems before 
they finished buying already obsolescent ones.  
Because we could manufacture the most advanced 
electronic components in our country, the Ameri-
can military no longer possessed a monopoly on 
the most sophisticated weaponry available. 
WORSE YET FOR THE AMERICANS, be-
sides believing that ―irregular warfare‖ reduced the 
need for high-technology air, space, and naval 
combat capabilities, they dramatically reduced 
such forces in favor of increasing the numbers of 
trendy "counterinsurgency" units.   
These were filled not with warriors specially 
trained for high-intensity combat but rather with a 
curious kind of ―soldier‖ described in their counte-
rinsurgency manual as one who ―must be prepared 
to become…a social worker, a civil engineer, a 
school teacher, a nurse, a boy scout.‖  As you know, 
we slaughtered these ―boy scouts‖ by the thou-
sands! 
Americans prided themselves in the fact that 
they transformed their military into a multitude of 
―culturally-sensitive‖ social workers who knew 
much about our history and customs.  What they 
knew too little about was how to fight an aggres-
sive, high-technology power who knew much about 
the ways of war.  Our troops were amused when 
captured American troops begged for their lives in 
our own language.  Of course, it did them no good. 
In any event, we found we could contend 
with the light, low-tech counterinsurgency units 
that comprised most of America's battle forces.  
Early in the 21st century the U.S. added over 
92,000 ground troops.  We cheered!  We wanted 
the Americans to be spending $40 billion a year on 
troops instead of technology.  We never feared 
America‘s ground forces because we were a nation 
that could easily put millions into the field to op-
pose them.  And we did so when the time came. 
What we did fear was America‘s high-
technology forces because they had the potential to 
block our ability to project power.  That is why we 
were thrilled when it became chic in the U.S. to 
denigrate the role of technology in war.  If anyone 
spoke approvingly of a high-tech weapon, they 
were immediately condemned as an out-of-fashion 
―Cold War‖ thinker.   
Strangely, even though it was widely known 
that we were building a high-tech, globally-capable 
force, the Americans seemed to ignore that in their 
planning.  While we were building fifth-generation 
fighters, they were turning their fearsome military 
into a ‗soft power‘ collection of do-gooders skilled 
mainly at winning hearts and minds.  Our missiles 
and bombs had no hearts and minds to win, and 
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the Americans paid with their lives accordingly.  
Our strategy was based on force, theirs on hope.   
WE CONSTANTLY LOOKED for imagina-
tive ways to undermine the U.S.‘s defense estab-
lishment as it had evolved in the 21st century.  For 
example, America had become increasingly depen-
dant upon its reserves and National Guard not as a 
strategic reserve as originally intended by their 
Founding Fathers, but as a force they depended 
upon to meet current operational requirements.  
This policy hurt them in a number of ways. 
It became the fashion in U.S. defense circles 
to say that part-time troops were the equivalent of 
regulars every way.  They made any departure from 
those assertions appear to be questioning the pa-
triotism and dedication of the part-timers.  No one 
wanted to accept that modern war is so psychologi-
cally daunting and technically complex that it is 
best waged by full-time professionals.  These truths 
were simply candid and frank analysis of military 
requirements, not assessments of people‘s charac-
ter, but they were politically unspeakable in Ameri-
ca.   
So America continued to pour costly incen-
tives into maintaining their part-timers, and even 
created ―missions‖ so as to justify their numbers.  
It became so attractive to serve as a part-timer that 
many full-time professionals opted into that status.  
Why make all the sacrifices to be a regular when 
virtually the same benefits were available to part-
timers who could choose where they wanted to live 
and, often, how frequently they wanted to serve?  
The denigration of the full-time professional in 
favor of the part-timer proved disastrous. 
What is more is that this policy underesti-
mated the importance of homeland security in the 
minds of America‘s state governors.  The threat of 
terrorism, as well as the increasing expectations of 
the electorate when natural disasters struck, 
caused governors to insist that these troops not be 
deployed overseas at times of crisis.  Consequently, 
as I will discuss in a moment, we did our best to 
create as many terrorist incidents as possible.  
When the Guard became politically ‗undeployable‘, 
it hobbled the U.S. military in the ability to con-
front us. 
The Americans had also come to depend 
upon a whole range of contractors to run their war 
machine.  Many American policymakers seemed to 
think that anything done by private companies was 
inherently cheaper and more efficient than gov-
ernment.  It is true that the competition of free en-
terprise will, in most cases, produce such results.  
However, warfighting is the exception that proves 
the rule.  Specifically, the mercenary values of the 
marketplace do not sustain people in the crucible 
of war. 
People in business make decisions based on 
cost-benefit analysis.  We recognized that no 
amount of money makes it ‗worth it‘ to any compa-
ny or, more importantly, any individual to die.  Of 
course, we aimed our most sophisticated and vi-
cious attacks on these contractors, and we enjoyed 
much success.  What is more, is that when we cap-
tured contractors, we designated them as unlawful 
combatants and tried them for their crimes against 
our People and The Party.  It did not take many 
executions before the contractors were walking 
away from their contracts, crippling the American 
military at the worst possible time.  
We used the indirect approach again by at-
tacking other vulnerable targets both inside and 
outside the United States.  For example, our agents 
acquire interests in companies around the world.  
When the time came, they refused to trade with the 
U.S.  More importantly, we controlled many finan-
cial institutions though our huge investment hold-
ings.  We were amazed at how naïve the Americans 
were to overlook our activities for the decade pre-
ceding the war. 
YOU KNOW THE REST, comrades.  Our 
high-tech forces often defeated the Americans on 
the battlefield, and we were able to inflict such pu-
nishment on their homeland that they were soon 
pleading for peace at any price.  With their military 
shattered, their economy reeling, and their people 
demoralized, their defeat was complete.  Their will 
was broken!   
As strong as our determination was, we 
would not have triumphed if America had not de-
ceived herself about the nature of future war.  She 
bled herself dry waging an endless series of ‗irregu-
lar wars‘ while her ability to fight ‗regular wars‘ 
atrophied.  She deluded herself about her conven-
tional superiority, and failed to realize the over-
arching importance of readiness to meet existential 
threats.   
Had America paid attention to the growing 
capabilities of militaries such as ours, she no doubt 
could have maintained such dominance that na-
tions like ours might not have dared to oppose her 
– we keenly understand brute force and its conse-
quences. 
Now the Americans beg for scraps.  So des-
perate are they that they send their children here to 
be our servants.  We control their future!  That is 
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the cost of defeat!  Let us praise the Party and the 
People! 
* * * 
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. is an active duty Air Force 
major general, and is the author of the essay, How 
We Lost the High Tech War of 2007, published in 
the January 29, 1996 issue of the WEEKLY STAN-
DARD from which this essay gets its inspiration. 
 
Additional biographical data, and official photo 
are all publicly available at 
http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bio
ID=5293.  
 
 
Book Excerpt:  Senator’s Son: An Iraq War Novel 
by Luke S. Larson 
 
Chapter 24 
Senator‘s Son: An Iraq War Novel will be available from your favorite booksellers, including Amazon, on 
February 25, 2010.  Published by K.E. Inc., Scottsdale, AZ.  © 2008, Luke S. Larson.  Reprinted here by 
permission.  See also:  Luke‘s site, Zenpundt review, and Chapter 1 via Google books. 
 
A white van with ―Wounded Warrior‖ 
printed on the side pulled up in front of the apart-
ment building. A reserve gunnery sergeant drove 
the van; he wore his uniform. John climbed in the 
van with his walker. He looked at the six other Ma-
rines, all of whom were junior enlisted. The oldest 
Marine barely looked twenty-one. The sight of 
them warmed his heart. God damn, I love Ma-
rines!  
―Hey, how‘s it going, sir,‖ said a Marine who 
recognized the lieutenant from Bethesda. 
―Good, good; just call me John today.‖  
He wore jeans and a polo shirt. All of the 
other wounded Marines were dressed in jeans and 
sweaters, no uniforms. 
―How are you doing?‖ asked John to the 
wounded veteran sitting next to him. 
 ―I‘m doing good,‖ said the lance corporal 
who lost his leg in an IED blast in Fallujah. ―They 
told me I was the fastest Marine they‘ve seen move 
from walking therapy to running therapy.  Also I 
got three of these bad boys.‖ 
The nineteen-year-old pulled up his left pant 
leg and tapped on his prosthetic. A Marine Corps 
sticker covered the manufacturer‘s name.  
―One for running, one for hiking, and one for 
everything else.‖  
The van pulled up and the motley crew 
limped their way inside the stadium. The youngest-
looking Marine of the bunch was named Paul. He 
was excited. He was going to get to throw the open-
ing pitch of the game. Private Paul looked normal 
in jeans but walked slightly hunched over with a 
slight limp. In the van, on the way to the game, the 
Marines showed their scars and swapped stories. 
Paul‘s story involved being ripped open by a mor-
tar round in Al Qaim. His stomach was a horrific 
site. John smiled at the private. This ought to be 
good. These men deserve to get a little celebration 
after all they’ve been through. 
As they walked to their seats, Paul was es-
corted down to the side of the field. John looked 
out onto the green field as a military color guard 
presented the flag during the national anthem. He 
left his walker in the aisle and struggled to stand on 
his own. 
As they started to the national anthem, John 
couldn‘t help notice the man in front of him did not 
remove his hat. The man looked thirty-something. 
He wore a Ralph Lauren windbreaker and khakis. 
He stood slouched seemingly disinterested as the 
national anthem played. His hat absorbed John‘s 
attention. 
―Excuse me,‖ said the Marine in a sharp 
tone. 
―Yes,‖ said the man turning his head back to 
look at the lieutenant. 
―Can you take your hat off please?‖ asked 
John. ―I find it disrespectful.‖ 
―Well I don‘t really give a damn what you 
think is disrespectful, this is a free country.‖ 
